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Abstract
Following the argument of Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph [1], new in-
terest has been raised on whether one can interpret state-vectors (pure
states) in a statistical way (ψ-epistemic theories), or if each one of them
corresponds to a different ontological entity. Each interpretation of quan-
tum theory assumes different ontology and one could ask if the PBR
argument carries over. Here we examine this question for histories formu-
lations in general with particular attention to the co-event formulation.
State-vectors appear as the initial state that enters into the quantum mea-
sure. While the PBR argument goes through up to a point, the failure
to meet some of the assumptions they made does not allow one to reach
their conclusion. However, the author believes that the “statistical inter-
pretation” is still impossible for co-events even if this is not proven by the
PBR argument.
1 Introduction
In quantum theory the state of a system is represented by the wavefunction 1.
While there is general agreement on how to use this state in order to extract
predictions in the form of relative frequencies of outcomes of multiple copies,
there is strong debate on the meaning of the wavefunction for single systems and
of the interpretation that is given to it. On the one hand, one can claim that
the state represents some real properties of the (single) system and thus attain
an ontological status. On the other hand, one can claim that the state reflects
the experimenters information about properties of the system. In the latter
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1A deeper discussion, could involve questioning the whole concept of wavefunction and
Hilbert space as starting point of quantum theory, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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view, the state is understood as a statistical distribution of different potential
realities (if one assumes that it makes sense talking about the real properties
of the system). Here we should stress, that the above considerations, concern
pure states, or in other words state-vectors, and in the following text when we
use the term “state” with no further specification, it should be understood as a
state-vector.
1.1 Statistical distribution or distinct ontological entities?
If one was to adopt the statistical view of the state, one would be lead to con-
clude the following: There is no way with a single experiment to be able to
deduce with 100% certainty which of two non-orthogonal states was your initial
state. This is in analogy with classical statistical physics, in the following sense.
If the experimenter has one of two possible distributions as initial information
(corresponding to two different initial states), and the distributions are overlap-
ping, there is no single experiment that can determine with certainty, which of
the two initial distributions was correct. This is due to the fact, that reality cor-
responds to a single point, and since the distributions are overlapping, there are
some potential realities that is consistent with either initial distributions/states.
If on the other hand, one takes the view that the state reflects some onto-
logical property of the system, then one should be able in principle to construct
a series of measurements (for the single system considered) that would be able
to distinguish between any two non-orthogonal states. This statement concerns
the wavefunction of single system and not about some statistical distribution of
the relative frequencies of outcomes of many identically prepared copies. Here
we should note, that in principle one can maintain the opinion that different
states corresponds to different realities, even if we cannot possibly distinguish
them experimentally. However, what is certain is that if one can distinguish
between any two states, then it is difficult to maintain the view that the state
corresponds to a statistical distribution.
The argument of Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (from now on referred to as
PBR) [1], provides an algorithm distinguishing between non-orthogonal states
and thus (according to the authors) ruling out a statistical interpretation or
what they call “ψ-epistemic theories”. In [2] the argument has been tested
experimentally, and following the assumptions that they made and re-stated,
quantum theory is confirmed and ψ-epistemic theories ruled out. The argument
along with its assumptions, will be presented in detail later.
The specifics of the PBR argument was claimed to be independent of the
actual ontology of quantum theory and thus potentially independent of the
interpretation one chooses. However it would be interesting to examine the
arguments details for particular interpretations and how the assumptions made
carry over. Particular interest, would be to do so for alternative formulations
of quantum theory (where the argument does not follow trivially) such as the
histories formulation, and the relation this has with the ability to retrodict
properties of the initial state of the universe. This precisely is the topic of this
paper.
2
1.2 Histories and initial state
In order to do this comparison, one first needs to understand what is the meaning
and role both conceptually and mathematically, of state-vectors in histories for-
mulations. Here, we should specify what we mean as histories formulation. They
are formulations of quantum theory, that assign (or use) a quantum amplitude
or a quantum measure to histories of the system. In other words, formulations
based on the Feynman path integral2. Examples of full interpretations based
on the path integral, are the decoherent (or consistent) histories approach (e.g.
[3]) and the co-event formulation (e.g. [4, 5]) which we will introduce in section
3.
In these formulations, the concept of the state of the system at a (random)
moment of time does not make sense. The only place that the state enters the
picture is the initial state of the universe strictly speaking or more practically,
the initial state of a subsystem we consider3. In the latter case, the initial state,
represents the complete summary of the past of our system. Mathematically
it enters by modifying the amplitudes of histories and thus the decoherence
functional and the quantum measure (see below).
In histories formulations, depending on the particular interpretation, one
gives ontological status to either a single history or a subset of histories (or to
something else such as a co-event which will be defined properly in section 3.3)
but not to the state of the system itself. However, one is still able to ascribe
ontological status to the initial state in the following sense. Since we are not
doing deterministic physics, starting from some initial state gives rise normally
to several potential realities. If one can show that the set of potential realities
that arise, if we start with one initial state is completely disjoint with the set
of potential realities of any other distinct initial state, then by determining
the actual realised reality, we can retrodict uniquely the state we started from.
One can speak about properties of the initial state which, in this sense, attains
ontological status. In other words, the universe where the initial state is |Ψ1〉 is
a different one from one that has a distinct initial state |Ψ2〉.
If on the other hand, one wishes to interpret the initial state as some short
of statistical distribution, then it is necessary that for a given reality there are
more than one initial states that are compatible with. In this case, it would be
impossible, no matter how fine-grained description one has, to have completely
disjoint sets of potential realities corresponding to (non-orthogonal) distinct
state-vectors.
The procedure to disprove the latter view, is to consider some sufficient
fine description, i.e. a sequence of measurements4 at suitable moments of time
2One can view the De Broglie-Bohm theory as a histories formulation, however in this paper
we use the term for formulations based on the Feynman path integral and the decoherence
functional, which is not the case for De Broglie-Bohm
3This is achieved by restricting the path integral to particular sets of histories and weighting
differently each of those
4Note that measurements are not understood as actual measurements with an external
experimenter, but rather by introducing different projections at different times and mathe-
matically fine graining histories. It is always possible however, to view the histories space
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that would give rise to sets of potential realties that are disjoint for distinct
state-vectors. This will be done in section 4 and in the Appendix.
Here, we should stress, that to draw conclusions for the histories formu-
lations, one needs to have a specific interpretation (what are those potential
realities) and is not possible to do so fully, only by looking at the quantum
measure.
If one is able to distinguish between different state-vectors, that would have
an important consequence for histories. We would be able, at least in principle,
to retrodict the initial state (if pure), uniquely. This is of great importance,
e.g. for cosmological considerations, where the histories formulations have been
applied extensively.
1.3 This paper
In this paper, in section 2 we will review the PBR argument illustrated with
the simplest example of the |Ψ1〉 = |0〉, |Ψ2〉 = |+〉 states, and point out the
assumptions made. In section 3 we will present the histories formulation, by
introducing the decoherence functional and the quantum measure and briefly
mentioning the co-event and the decoherent histories formulations. In section
4 we analyse the PBR argument for histories, looking the quantum measure
and examining the potential co-events in detail for two versions of the example
considered in section 2. In section 5 we will see how the assumptions of PBR
argument affect our conclusion for the co-events formulation and in section 6
we will summarise and conclude.
2 The PBR argument
In this part, following [1], we provide an algorithm that one could follow to show
that two non-orthogonal state-vectors correspond to distinct realities and could
not possibly be confused as a statistical interpretation would imply.
Assume that two states5 Ψ1,Ψ2 correspond to a statistical distribution of
some underlying true properties. This would imply that with some probability
p 6= 0 the true properties of the system are such that they are compatible with
both the system being in state Ψ1 and Ψ2. Now imagine we consider a pair of
identical systems such that each of them can be either in state Ψ1 or in state Ψ2.
This can be realised by considering two boxes that each of them generates either
Ψ1 or Ψ2 with some probability p. Then, provided that the two systems are
independent, with probability p2 the true underlying properties of the composite
system would be compatible with the system being in any of the four states6
|Ψ1,Ψ1〉, |Ψ1,Ψ2〉, |Ψ2,Ψ1〉, |Ψ2,Ψ2〉. Then by choosing to make a measurement
differently, in terms of the finest possible description and its coarse-grainings, that does not
require the concept of projection operator as a prerequisite.
5Where 〈Ψ1|Ψ2〉 6= 0
6Note that the above can be generalised for n copies of the system.
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in a suitable basis for the composite system, one can show that no outcome of
that measurement is compatible with all of those potential initial states.
Let us see it here with a simple example, of two particular non-orthogonal
states of a qubit, the |Ψ1〉 = |0〉 and the |Ψ2〉 = |+〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉+ |1〉) states.
If |Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2〉 were not distinct entities but corresponded to statistical
distribution of some underlying true properties, then there must be some pos-
sible realities, where one cannot distinguish between the four states |00〉, |0+〉,
| + 0〉, | + +〉. In particular the chance of being in one such case is p2 where
p = |〈0|+〉|2 = 1/2. For those cases, no measurement should be able to distin-
guish between the four above states. In other words, it should not be possible
to measure the composite system and get with certainty (probability 1 or 0)
that any one of the four above states is not possible, since that would not be
compatible with the cases that appear with probability p2 6= 0 that those four
states are indistinguishable.
Assume now that we measure the composite system in the following basis7:
|ξ1〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) , |ξ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0−〉+ |1+〉),
|ξ3〉 = 1√
2
(|+ 1〉+ | − 0〉) , |ξ4〉 = 1√
2
(|+−〉+ | −+〉) (1)
We are lead to paradox because, there is no outcome of this measurement that
is compatible with the system being all four initial states. In particular, if the
initial state was |00〉 then |ξ1〉 never occurs, if |0+〉 then |ξ2〉 never occurs, if
| + 0〉 then |ξ3〉 never occurs and if | + +〉 then |ξ4〉 never occurs. But since
{|ξi〉} forms a complete basis, one outcome always occurs, and thus with cer-
tainty we can conclude that the system never is compatible with all four states
|Ψi,Ψj〉. Depending on the outcome, every time we rule out one of the four ini-
tial states. From this observation, the authors conclude that the single system
is not compatible with both |Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2〉 and thus a statistical interpretation
is not possible.
The argument can be extended for any two non-orthogonal states provided
one considers a suitable number n of identical (and non-interacting) copies and
performs a measurement in a particular basis on the total tensor product Hilbert
space. The reader is referred to the original papers [1],[2] for details.
At this point, we should stress what assumptions were made (and stated)
by the authors in order to reach their conclusion.
1. The quantum states are prepared in isolation of the rest universe and
after that the (individual) system has a well defined set of physical prop-
erties. Each sub-system is in pure state, so no complications arise from
consideration of entangled systems.
2. It is possible to prepare multiple (identical) systems that are uncorrelated.
This can be realised by considering spacelike separated apparatuses or
7|−〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 − |1〉)
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using the same apparatus at much later times. Note, that due to this
point we are allowed to deduce that if with probability p something occurs
in the single system then we get with probability p2 this thing occurring
at both copies of the composite system.
3. The measuring devices respond only to physical properties of the measured
systems. However, this does not need to be in a deterministic way.
The experimental test of the argument in [2] also assumes the above assump-
tions, and in particular failure to satisfy them (as we will see in section 5),
allows for reaching different conclusion. Further discussion of the assumptions
will follow at section 5, and in relation with histories formulations.
3 Histories and co-events
In histories formulations the central mathematical structure of interest, is the
history space Ω, the space of all finest grained descriptions8. It is the set of all
possible histories, and each element of it hi ∈ Ω corresponds to a full description
of the system, specifying every detail and property. For example, a fine grained
history gives the exact position of the system along with the specification of
any internal degree of freedom, for every moment of time. For a single non-
relativistic particle, Ω would be the space of all trajectories in the physical space.
Subsets of Ω are called events and correspond to all the physical questions one
can ask. If, for example, one wishes to ask “was the system at the region ∆ at
time t?”, it corresponds to the subset A defined as {A : hi ∈ A iff hi(t) ∈ ∆},
i.e. all histories that the system at time t is in the region ∆.
3.1 Amplitudes, decoherence functional
and quantum measure
One can assign an amplitude (complex number) to each history following the
Feynman path integral approach. This amplitude, depends on the initial state
and on the dynamics of the system encoded in the action S:
α(hi) = exp iS(hi) (2)
Using this amplitude one can recover the transition amplitudes from (x1, t1)
to (x2, t2) by summing through all the paths P obeying the initial and final
condition:
α(x1, t1;x2, t2) =
∫
P
exp(iS[x(t)])Dx(t) (3)
8Note, that following Hartle and Sorkin, we are adopting the path integral view of histories
that takes the stance that there exist a unique (preferred) fine grained description, i.e. paths
in the generalised configuration space. Other points of view, such as Isham’s, are compatible
with the one we take, at least in most ordinary cases.
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The mod square of this amplitude is the transition probability. Using the Feyn-
man amplitudes Eq. (2) one can define the decoherence functional:
D(A,B) =
∫
A
exp (−iS[x(t)])Dx[(t)]
∫
B
exp (+iS[y(t)])Dy[(t)]×
δ(x(tf )− y(tf ))ρ(x(t0), y(t0)) (4)
Where A and B are any subsets of Ω, tf is the final while t0 the initial moment
of time considered and ρ the initial state. The decoherence functional obeys the
following conditions:
1. Hermiticity: D(A,B) = D∗(B,A)
2. Bi-linearity: D(A ⊔B,C) = D(A,C) +D(B,C)
3. Strong positivity9: the matrix D(Ai, Aj) is positive for any collection
{A1, A2, · · · , An} of subsets of Ω.
4. Normalisation10:
∑
i,j D(Ai, Aj) = 1
The decoherence functional can also be defined using time ordered strings
of projection operators. In particular
D(A,B) = Tr(C†AρCB) (5)
Where CA and CB are the class operators, which are strings of time ordered
projection operators corresponding to the histories A and B respectively that
we will specify below and is defined in the following way.
CA = PAnU(tn − tn−1) · · ·U(t3 − t2)PA2U(t2 − t1)PA1 (6)
Where the U(t) is the unitary evolution operator that relates to the Hamiltonian
via U(t) = exp(−iHt), and PAi is the subspace that history A lied at time ti.
The history A is the subset of Ω that contains all the histories that the system
lies in the subspace that PA1 projects to, at time t1 and in the subspace that
PA2 projects to, at time t2, etc. The projection operators in general can be
at any subspace of the Hilbert space. Note that the expression for the class
operator, is precisely the one used in ordinary quantum mechanics to obtain
the amplitude, if some external observer carried out those measurements at
the given times. By the linearity property of the decoherence functional the
Eq. (5) can be extended to subsets of Ω that are not just strings of projection
operators (called inhomogeneous histories). Here we are not going into deeper
discussion of the differences of those two definitions and their interpretational
9Initially this requirement was weaker, namely that D(A,A) ≥ 0 and was called positivity.
However, it is believed that this stronger requirement is more physical and we will adopt this
convention here.
10The sum in the expression should be replaced with an integral if we consider continuous
histories
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consequences. We will simply use the operator expression for finite moments
of time histories, since it is more easy to deal with. However, one can see that
the two definitions are essentially equivalent for the examples considered in this
paper.
From the positivity condition, we can see that the diagonal elements of the
decoherence functional are non-negative. Those terms are also referred to, as
quantum measure ([6]) and are labelled as µ(A) := D(A,A). It is important to
note, that only the real part of the decoherence functional affects the quantum
measure. This property, in relation with extending the quantum measure for
composite systems, will be discussed at section 5.
One could be tempted to interpret the quantum measure as probability.
However this is not possible, due to interference. The additivity condition of
probabilities, is not satisfied:
µ(A ⊔B) 6= µ(A) + µ(B) (7)
However a weaker condition holds that shows that there is no three-paths in-
terference:
µ(A ⊔B ⊔ C) = µ(A ⊔B) + µ(A ⊔ C) + µ(B ⊔C)− µ(A)− µ(B)− µ(C) (8)
Interpreting the quantum measure, is the issue of histories formulations, and in
this paper we will focus on the decoherent histories and the co-event formula-
tions11.
Provided the initial state is pure, we can define the quantum measure in
terms of amplitudes for histories
µ(A) =
∑
i,j
α∗(hi)α(hj)× δ(hi(tf )− hj(tf )) (9)
It is important to note the delta function that guarantees that histories that do
not end (final time tf ) at the same point, do not interfere. In other words, the
quantum measure becomes additive if one considers alternatives that differ at
the final moment of time.
Another thing to note, when one considers the operator definition of the
decoherence functional, is what happens if one introduces more moments of
time. This is simply a fine graining of the previous histories as it is easily seen
from the definition using the paths/trajectories.
A final issue to discuss, before introducing interpretations of the quantum
measure, is the sets of histories that have quantum measure zero. Those sets
of histories will be referred to as precluded sets. In general, there are two kind
of quantum measure zero sets. The trivial ones, that all their subsets have also
11Other attempts have been made, such as using some special precluded sets, at the original
papers introducing the quantum measure [6] by Sorkin, or extending the concept of probability
to maintain a single-history-realised view, more recently in [7] by Gell-Mann and Hartle
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quantum measure zero (similarly with classical measure zero sets), and the non-
trivial, that have subsets that are non-zero. The latter are due to interference
and are the source of any counter-intuitive property.
If a set A has quantum measure zero then it decoheres with its compliment12
µ(A) + µ(¬A) = 1 = µ(A ∪ ¬A). This along with other considerations lead us
to the conclusion that quantum measure zero sets, do not occur in nature. We
further need to assume that any set B ⊆ A also does not occur if A does not
occur, if one wishes to maintain classical deductive reasoning such as the Modus
Ponens (see [8]). However, this could lead us to trouble, because it is known
that generally, one can cover the full history space Ω with zero quantum measure
sets [9].
3.2 Decoherent histories approach to quantum theory
Decoherent histories (also known as consistent histories) is an approach de-
veloped, initially, mainly by Griffiths, Omnes and Gell-Mann and Hartle (eg.
[3]). The decoherence functional, first appeared in relation with this approach.
The mathematical aim of the approach is to tell when it is possible to assign
probabilities to (coarse-grained) histories of a closed quantum system, or in the
language we developed above, when is it possible to assign the quantum measure
of a set of histories A as the probability of this set A actually occurring.
Different people have given different motivations for the approach, but the
general aim is to be able to reason about a closed system with no reference to
observer or an a-priori distinction of microscopic and macroscopic degrees of
freedom, or distinction of quantum and classical systems. The field of quan-
tum cosmology which is the ultimate closed quantum system, was one of the
motivation for this approach, while the way that classicality emerges and its
connection with decoherence, was another.
In order to make the quantum measure into a proper classical measure, one
needs to restrict attention to some particular collection of subsets of Ω rather
than the full collection of all possible subsets of Ω. The failure to satisfy the
additivity condition can be traced at the off-diagonal terms of the decoherence
functional as one can see from the very definition13. Let us take a partition of
Ω which is defined to be a collection of subsets P1 = {A11, A12, · · · , A1n} where
A1i ∩ A1j = ∅ and ∪iA1i = Ω. The superscript labels the partition considered,
while the subscript labels the different cells of one partition. If for any pair of
cells of one partition A1i , A
1
j it holds that
D(A1i , A
1
j) = 0 if i 6= j (10)
then the partition is called a consistent set. For this partition and any further
coarse-graining, the standard rules of probability theory hold. The quantum
12This is not necessarily true if one considers the weaker notion of positive decoherence
functionals.
13Strictly speaking, from the real part of the off-diagonal terms. The role the complex part
plays will be briefly discussed later.
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measure, when restricted to those questions, becomes a classical measure. One
would be tempted to assign these probabilities to the coarse-grained histories of
the partition.
However, one can consider other partitions, say P2 = {A21, A22, · · · , A2n}. It
is possible that this partition also forms a consistent set obeying Eq. (10). Im-
portant thing to note, is that there does not exist, one finest-grained consistent
set, that all other consistent sets are simply coarse-graining of that. One is not
allowed to make propositions involving sets that belong to separate consistent
sets, and thus cannot properly assign probabilities to histories once and for all,
but it is dependent (contextual) to the consistent set one considers. Counter-
intuitive consequences have been analysed (eg. by Dowker and Kent [10]) and
at this point we can only say that one cannot assign probabilities to histories in
a classical sense. The minimalist view, is that one could use present records cor-
responding to one consistent set, to deduce things about other present records
related with the same consistent set. In this language, being able to deduce
things about the initial state of the universe from present records, would imply
the ability to make further present time predictions. Being able to distinguish
between different initial state-vectors, which is the discussion of the present
paper, lie within this scope.
3.3 The co-events formulation of quantum theory
The co-event formulation was developed mainly by Sorkin [4, 11] and collabo-
rators (e.g. [9, 12, 13, 14]). A review can be found here [5]. It is a more recent
attempt, to maintain a realistic picture of closed systems quantum theory and
being able to speak about properties of the closed system being possessed ob-
jectively. In classical physics, there are three structures if one wishes to use the
histories language.
First, the histories space Ω and the collection of all subsets of Ω which form
a boolean algebra U , second the space of truth values T = {1, 0} also forms
a boolean algebra and finally third the valuation maps φ which assign a truth
value 1, 0 to all questions/subsets of Ω. These maps we call them co-events and
in classical physics need to respect the boolean structure of U and T and be a
homomorphism
φ(A△B) = φ(A) + φ(B)
φ(A · B) = φ(A ∩B) = φ(A)φ(B) (11)
One can show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between single histories
(points at Ω) and homomorphic co-events, in this way
φh(A) = 1 if h ∈ A and φh(A) = 0 if h ∈ ¬A (12)
i.e. when the co-event φh is a characteristic map of h. We usually assume that
reality is one element (say h) of Ω, the one that is actually realised. We can see
here, due to the above correspondence, that we could have a dual view, and say
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that the co-event/characteristic map φh is what is truly realised. The potential
realities, thus are all the co-events that correspond to some history h that does
not have zero (classical) measure.
In quantum theory the above picture cannot be maintained, due to the fact
that we have a quantum measure on Ω. One could weaken the requirement that
the maps are homomorphisms and allow them to be non-additive. In particular,
we could have multiplicative co-events that
φ(A · B) = φ(A ∩B) = φ(A)φ(B)
φ(A△B) 6= φ(A) + φ(B) (13)
Then one can show that all the multiplicative co-events are to one-to-one cor-
respondence not with single histories but to subsets of histories, in other words
they are characteristic maps of non-trivial subsets A.
φA(B) = 1 iff A ⊆ B (14)
One can see that if A is neither subset of B nor of ¬B, then both B and
¬B are false. This precisely is where the strangeness of quantum theory is
encoded. However, if the possible A are small enough, one would expect that
all classical questions would be too coarse-grained to intersect non-trivially A,
and no paradox would appear. One should note, that if a particular co-event
corresponds to a characteristic function of a set with a single history, it gives rise
to completely classical logic (homomorphism) and in this sense we will refer to
it as a “classical co-event” even if the system it arises may allow other co-events
that are not of this type.
Other than the requirement to be multiplicative, the allowed co-events must
(a) be preclusive, i.e. respect that µ(A) = 0 =⇒ φ(A) = 0 and (b) be minimal
(called primitive), i.e. be as small as possible, providing they obey multiplica-
tivity and preclusivity (e.g. [14] for greater detail). The first requirement, uses
the quantum measure and it is at this point where the dynamics (Hamiltonian)
and initial state of the particular system enters the picture. In order to recover
the full probabilistic predictions, one apparently needs to use the quantum mea-
sure and resort to the Cournot principle. Cournot’s principle, is the following:
“In a repeated trial, an event A singled out in advance, of small measure (≤ ǫ),
rarely occurs”. The details on how this can be used to recover the probabilistic
predictions of quantum theory (e.g. double slit pattern) can be found in [12],
and a shorter version in section 4.2 of reference [5]. We should stress however,
that ontological status of the state-vector that we examine in this paper, is not
directly related with the way of recovering the probabilistic predictions. In PBR
argument, for example, the particular values of probabilities, play no role.
To summarise, the potential realities for the co-event formulation, are the
set of all primitive, preclusive and multiplicative co-events. From now on, when
we mention co-events or potential realities, we will refer precisely to these.
Two important features of the co-event formulation, are the following. First,
that the deductive logical inferences are possible, namely the Modus Ponens rule
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of inference holds for multiplicative co-events (and only for those!) [8]. Second,
that one has a unique finest grained classical partition. In other words, there
exist a finest grained description, such that, no matter which co-event is realised,
the resulting (coarse-grained) logic is classical (see appendix of [12]). This is
different than in decoherent histories, where one has incompatible consistent
sets.
As a final point at this section, we should stress that in general there are
many potential co-events, given a quantum measure. This is in analogy with
classical stochastic physics and we could claim that quantum theory constitutes
generalisation of stochastic physics rather than deterministic. We thus have a
set of possible realities C. Measurements made, narrow down this set of potential
co-events and we may or may not be able to narrow it down to the single co-event
that is actually realised.
If unsure of which was the initial state, we have many possible sets Ci of
co-events, each set corresponding to one candidate initial state ψi. If we carry
out a measurement and get a result that is not possible in any of the co-events
of one particular set (say for example C3), we can safely deduce that the initial
state was not the one that has as possible co-events this set (ψ3 in this example).
In other words we would be able to deduce things about the initial state of the
system (or more ambitiously stated, of the universe).
The reader is referred to the original references for a more complete and de-
tailed presentation. Here we only introduced the necessary material and stressed
few things that are important for this paper.
4 PBR for co-events
In order to see the PBR argument for co-events one has to first construct the
above experiment in a histories version, then compute the quantum measure
and finally find the potential realities, i.e. the potential co-events. The first two
steps are common in all histories formulations, however the conclusion of the
argument is possible only after one considers the potential realities.
Different initial states give rise to different quantum measures and thus dif-
ferent set of possible realities/co-events. The PBR argument, needs to show
that there exists no common co-event, between the different sets of possible co-
events corresponding to different initial states. If this is shown we will be able
to conclude that there is no possible reality/co-event compatible with the state
being both |Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2〉.
Here we will consider the simple example presented in section 2 with the
qubit starting in either |Ψ1〉 = |0〉 or |Ψ2〉 = |+〉. The way to realise in histories
language the PBR argument is not unique. We will first see the simpler version,
where we have a single moment of time and it is essentially the PBR argument
casted into co-events language. Then we will consider an apparatus with two
moments of time, that gives a better picture of the histories formulations, having
given preferred status in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis in analogy with the preferred fine
grained set of histories being the configuration space basis. The latter version,
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involves more of the features of the co-event formulation, since both non-trivial
quantum measure zero sets exist and non-classical co-events.
4.1 Version 1
We consider two copies (uncorrelated and with no interaction) of a qubit, that
can be in either the state |0〉 or in the state |+〉. In other words the initial state
is one of the following:
|Ψ1,Ψ1〉 = |00〉 , |Ψ1,Ψ2〉 = |0+〉
|Ψ2,Ψ1〉 = |+ 0〉 , |Ψ2,Ψ2〉 = |++〉 (15)
After preparing the initial state in one of those four states, we measure it in
the {|ξi〉} basis given in Eq.(1). We label history hi the one that the system
is found in state |ξi〉. In other words, for example, h1 is the history that the
system starts from one the four states of Eq. (15) and then is found being in the
|ξ1〉 state. The quantum measure, and thus the possible co-events are different
for each possible initial state.
For initial state |Ψ1,Ψ1〉 = |00〉, the quantum measure of different fine
grained histories is the following:
µ11(h1) = 0, µ11(h2) = 1/4, µ11(h3) = 1/2, µ11(h4) = 1/4 (16)
Where the subscript at the quantum measure, denotes that it corresponds to
the initial state |Ψ1,Ψ1〉. Note that this is a trivial histories space, since it has
only a single moment of time. Alternative histories, decohere, since they lie at
the final moment of time, and thus the quantum measure is additive and fully
given by the quantum measure on the fine grained histories. If there were more
moments of time, in order to fully characterise the quantum measure, one could
give the amplitudes for different histories as we will do at version 2.
There is only one quantum measure zero set, which is the single history {h1}
and thus the potential co-events are all classical. The set of possible co-events
for the initial state |00〉 are
C1 = {{h2}, {h3}, {h4}} (17)
For initial state |Ψ1,Ψ2〉 = |0+〉, the quantum measure of different fine grained
histories is the following:
µ12(h1) = 1/4, µ12(h2) = 0, µ12(h3) = 1/2, µ12(h4) = 1/4 (18)
And the set of possible co-events for the initial state |0+〉 are
C2 = {{h1}, {h3}, {h4}} (19)
For initial state |Ψ2,Ψ1〉 = |+0〉, the quantum measure of different fine grained
histories is the following:
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µ21(h1) = 1/4, µ21(h2) = 1/2, µ21(h3) = 0, µ21(h4) = 1/4 (20)
And the set of possible co-events for the initial state |+ 0〉 are
C3 = {{h1}, {h2}, {h4}} (21)
For initial state |Ψ2,Ψ2〉 = |++〉, the quantum measure of different fine grained
histories is the following:
µ22(h1) = 1/2, µ22(h2) = 1/4, µ22(h3) = 1/4, µ22(h4) = 0 (22)
And the set of possible co-events for the initial state |++〉 are
C4 = {{h1}, {h2}, {h3}} (23)
The important thing to notice here, is that there is no common co-event for
these four different initial states, namely:
C1
⋂
C2
⋂
C3
⋂
C4 = ∅ (24)
This implies that there is no potential reality, that is compatible with all four
above initial states. Carrying out the measurement suggested in PBR argument,
leads us to exclude one of the four initial states as the initial state of the system.
Which one is excluded, depends on the outcome of the measurement. This
is close, but not quite the same, as saying that we can definitely distinguish
between the state |Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2〉. We will come back to this point in section 5
in the discussion.
4.2 Version 2
Since the quantum measure is affected from the particulars of the measure-
ments/histories considered, one could expect that realising the above set up
in a different way could affect the conclusion in relation with the possible co-
events. Since in histories formulation, preferred status is given to the “actual”
fine grained histories that correspond to paths at the (extended) configuration
space, one could see that the analogous thing to do for a qubit, is to measure
it in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis solely. So while we start with the same four possible
initial states given by Eq. (15) as in version 1 we consider different histories
which in other words corresponds to a more fine grained description.
We have fine grained histories, starting at one of the four initial states,
then both particles are “measured” in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis, and finally they are
measured in the {|ξi〉} basis.
The possible histories are labeled as h00ξi if the system (no matter which
initial state we consider) is found in |00〉 and then in |ξi〉, h10ξi if it is in |10〉 and
then in |ξi〉 etc. In order to find the co-events, one needs for a given initial state
to compute the quantum measure and find the quantum measure zero sets. Since
histories in this version do not trivially decohere (unless they end at different
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final time) the most convenient way to write down the quantum measure, is in
terms of the amplitudes of different fine grained histories. If a set of histories
ends at the same outcome at the final time, then the quantum measure is simply
the mod square of the sum of the amplitudes of fine grained histories. For the
fine grained histories the quantum measure is given by µ(hi) = |α(hi)|2.
For initial state |Ψ1,Ψ1〉 = |00〉 we have these quantum amplitudes:
α11(00ξ1) = 0 , α11(00ξ2) = 1/2
α11(00ξ3) = 1/2 , α11(00ξ4) = 1/
√
2 (25)
and zero amplitude for all the other histories. Here, too, there are no non-trivial
quantum measure zero sets. We therefore have only three classical co-events
C1 = {{h00ξ2}, {h00ξ3}, {h00ξ4}} (26)
Important to note here that there is no co-event ending at ξ1.
For initial state |Ψ1,Ψ2〉 = |0+〉 we have these quantum amplitudes:
α12(00ξ1) = 0 , α12(00ξ2) =
1
2
√
2
α12(00ξ3) =
1
2
√
2
, α12(00ξ4) = 1/2
α12(01ξ1) = 1/2 , α12(01ξ2) = − 1
2
√
2
α12(01ξ3) =
1
2
√
2
, α12(01ξ4) = 0
α12(10ξi) = 0 , α12(11ξi) = 0 (27)
In this case, we see that there is one non-trivial quantum measure zero set. The
set {h00ξ2 , h01ξ2} has quantum measure zero, while the fine grained histories
have both quantum measure 1/8. Here again we have the following allowed
co-events:
C2 = {{h00ξ3}, {h00ξ4}, {h01ξ1}, {h01ξ4}} (28)
And we should note, that none of these co-events, ends at ξ2.
For initial state |Ψ2,Ψ1〉 = |+ 0〉 we have these quantum amplitudes:
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α21(00ξ1) = 0 , α21(00ξ2) =
1
2
√
2
α21(00ξ3) =
1
2
√
2
, α21(00ξ4) = 1/2
α21(10ξ1) = 1/2 , α21(10ξ2) =
1
2
√
2
α21(10ξ3) = − 1
2
√
2
, α21(10ξ4) = 0
α21(01ξi) = 0 , α21(11ξi) = 0 (29)
we see that here too there is one non-trivial quantum measure zero set. The set
{h00ξ3 , h10ξ3} has quantum measure zero, while the fine grained histories have
both quantum measure 1/8. We have the following allowed co-events:
C3 = {{h00ξ2}, {h00ξ4}, {h10ξ1}, {h10ξ2}} (30)
And we should note, that none of these co-events, ends at ξ3.
Finally, for initial state |Ψ2,Ψ2〉 = |++〉 we have these quantum amplitudes:
α22(00ξ1) = 0 , α22(00ξ2) = 1/4
α22(00ξ3) = 1/4 , α22(00ξ4) =
1
2
√
2
α22(01ξ1) =
1
2
√
2
, α22(01ξ2) = −1/4
α22(01ξ3) = 1/4 , α22(01ξ4) = 0
α22(10ξ1) =
1
2
√
2
, α22(10ξ2) = 1/4
α22(10ξ3) = −1/4 , α22(10ξ4) = 0
α22(11ξ1) = 0 , α22(11ξ2) = 1/4
α22(11ξ3) = 1/4 , α22(11ξ4) = − 1
2
√
2
(31)
We have several non-trivial quantum measure zero sets, namely: {h00ξ4 , h11ξ4},
{h00ξ2 , h01ξ2} , {h01ξ2 , h10ξ2} , {h01ξ2 , h11ξ2} , {h00ξ3 , h10ξ3} , {h01ξ3 , h10ξ3} and
{h10ξ3 , h11ξ3}.
The allowed co-events are more complicated in this case and there exist
some non-classical co-events (corresponding to pairs of histories). There are two
classical co-events ending at ξ1, three co-events consisting of pairs of histories,
ending at ξ2 and the same at ξ3 while there is no co-event ending at ξ4. In
particular, the co-events are:
C4 = {{h01ξ1}, {h10ξ1}, {h00ξ2 , h10ξ2}, {h00ξ2, h11ξ2}, {h10ξ2 , h11ξ2},
{h00ξ3 , h01ξ3}, {h00ξ3, h11ξ3}, {h01ξ3 , h11ξ3}} (32)
The important thing to conclude from this analysis is that there is no com-
mon co-event for these different initial states either:
C1
⋂
C2
⋂
C3
⋂
C4 = ∅ (33)
Thus we can see that if the ontology of quantum theory is that of a co-event,
we deduce that there is no conceivable reality that is compatible with the state
being all four states |00〉, |0+〉, |+0〉, |++〉. This result, that was also present in
version 1, is therefore maintained even if we further fine-grain the system. We
should note that in this version of the example, we had more than one moments
of times and there were non-trivial quantum measure zero sets that also lead
to having some possible non-classical co-events. All this complication, did not
affect the above conclusion. However, to make the final step, and conclude that
we can always distinguish between distinct state-vectors, as the PBR arguments
claims, we need to review and examine the assumptions made14.
5 Assumptions and discussion
In the end of Section 2, the assumptions of this theorem were briefly stated.
The first assumption was that one can prepare a state of a system in isolation
from the rest of the universe and its individual well defined physical properties
depend only on this state and not in any sense from the rest of the universe,
and the second that constructing multiple unrelated copies of the system is
possible. The third was that the outcomes of the measuring deices respond
solely to physical properties of the measured systems.
The first two assumptions are not (at least obviously) valid in general if one
uses the Feynman path integral and the quantum measure. For co-events, for
example, we know it is not true. The property that forbids one to take these
two assumptions, is how the quantum measure of a composite system relates to
the quantum measure of individual subsystems.
The quantum measure of a composite system is not in general the product
of the quantum measures of the individual subsystems, even if there is no in-
teraction between the subsystems. It is not even clear, how one would define
the composite quantum measure if he was simply given the quantum measure
of the subsystems.
One of the reasons for this failure, is related to the fact that to each quantum
measure there correspond infinite different decoherence functionals. In particu-
lar, any two decoherence functionals that differ only in their complex part, give
rise to the same quantum measure. While this does not affect the predictions
for a single system, no matter the approach one takes (decoherent histories or
co-events), it does affect considerations of composite systems. If one is given the
decoherence functional of a single system, there is a preferred way to construct
the composite (two copies of) system decoherence functional, by simply taking
14Here we have presented the analysis for the specific example of the qubit in those two
states. As in the original paper [1] it can be extended for arbitrary states.
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the product of the two individual decoherence functionals. However, this also
leads to some paradoxes.
In particular, we could have two uncorrelated and non-interacting systems,
that all the individual histories are possible, i.e. no history has zero amplitude
and moreover no coarse-grained history of the individual subsystems has quan-
tum measure zero. By considering the quantum measure that arises from taking
the product decoherence functional, we now have some coarse grained histories
having quantum measure zero, and therefore not all combinations of individual
outcomes are allowed. Moreover, this property arises from simply considering
the two uncorrelated, non-interacting systems together.
The reason that this problem that appears for sets with quantum measure
zero is important, is twofold. First, because sets with quantum measure zero,
decohere with their negation, as we show earlier, and thus necessarily belong to
one decoherent set. The second, is because those sets are used in the co-event
formulation in order to find the potential co-event.
A simple example of what could go wrong is given here. Assume we have a
decoherence functional given by:
DA =
1
2
(
1 i
−i 1
)
(34)
In this example, no history is precluded, since there exist no quantum measure
zero set. History h1 corresponds to the (1, 1) entry of the matrix and h2 to the
(2, 2). One can also note, that for this system there is no non-trivial decoherent
set since we adopt the medium decoherence condition that requires both the real
and imaginary part of the off-diagonal parts of the decoherence functional to
vanish15. Consider two identical systems and take their deoherence functional
be their product:
DAB =
1
4


1 i i −1
−i 1 1 i
−i 1 1 i
−1 −i −i 1

 (35)
We can now see that there is a nontrivial quantum measure zero set.
µ({h11, h22}) = 0
We can conclude from that that the coarse-grained history {h11, h22} is not
possible. A subset of this history, and thus also precluded, is the history where
both subsystems are at h1. Similarly the history that both subsystems are at
h2 is subset of {h11, h22} and thus precluded. However, no such preclusion was
possible if we were simply looking the single systems decoherence functionals.
One can claim that there is an (anti)correlation of the two systems, even though
there is no entanglement and interaction.
15This particular example, is weakly decoherent, but one can construct more complicated
examples that even this is not true.
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Another aspect of this property can be seen, if we note that for the composite
system, there is a non-trivial decoherent set, that follows from the existence of
the zero set. The partition of Ω = {A,B} where A = {h11, h22} and B =
{h12, h21} is a decoherent set. For the individual systems however, there was
no such set. Note that, while it is true that the product of two non-interacting
(medium) decoherent sets of histories give rise to a decoherent set of histories,
the converse is not true. We can have a decoherent set of histories on the product
system of two non-interacting subsystems, with no analogue for the individual
subsystems. This observation, highlights the failure of the assumptions of the
PBR argument for histories.
A side-note, here is that it was already known that there are issues with
composite systems if one considers the decoherence functional. For example
in the consistent histories framework, Diosi in [15] showed that if one requires
weak decoherence, i.e. that only the real part of the decoherence functional
needs to vanish, then one is lead to contradictions by considering non-interacting
composite systems. In particular, the weak decoherence condition might hold
for subsystems but not for the total composite system16. This was probably the
strongest reason of adopting the medium (or stronger) decoherence condition
for the decoherent histories approach.
From the latter observation, one could be tempted to conclude, that is-
sues with composite systems, arise from the complex part of the decoherence
functional and that a possible restriction to real decoherence functional could
resolve them17. However, this is also not true. One can construct a purely real
decoherence functional and when considering a composite system, still getting
new quantum measure zero sets and their interpretational consequences18. The
analysis of this property is the subject of an ongoing work [17].
To this end, we must stress that there is a special type of correlation between
systems in histories formulations that is not related to entanglement. This pre-
cise property, forbids one to make the final step at the PBR argument. To recall
the full argument, it was first shown that if one measures in the {|ξi〉} basis, any
possible outcome is consistent with the system having started with only three of
the total four possible initial states of the composite system |Ψ1,Ψ1〉, |Ψ1,Ψ2〉,
|Ψ2,Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2,Ψ2〉. e.g. if ξ1 is the outcome of the measurement, we know
definitely the system did not start at |Ψ1,Ψ1〉, but could have started form any
of the other three composite states. The second part of the argument, was to
relate this with properties of the single system. In particular, they concluded
that there is no outcome that can be consistent with both systems being both
|Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2〉. If |Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2〉 were merely overlapping distributions of some
underlying potential realities, then with some non-zero probability the reality
16In his work on extending the probabilities [16], Hartle has also point out this strange
property for his extended probabilities. According to his work, however, when restricted to
“settleable” questions the probabilities of composite systems, behave classically.
17Of course one would need to show that the real decoherence functionals give rise to all
the properties one would expect from experiments.
18However, the examples with purely real decoherence functional, involve higher cardinality
histories space Ω, since no such example exist in the 2 histories space mentioned above.
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that is actually realised, would lie in the overlapping part and thus, in these
cases, any possible measurement would not be able to tell which was the initial
state. The initial state would no longer have any ontological status.
We need to stress here, that the second part of the argument, lies on the
assumption, that the joint distribution of the two single systems is merely the
product of the distributions of the individual systems (for unrelated, disentan-
gled, non-interacting systems). However, as we analysed above, this is not true
for the histories and the quantum measure of composite systems, and it is not
at all clear if and how can this argument be completed.
The conclusion of the PBR argument, namely that state-vectors cannot be
interpreted statistically, could still hold for co-events (in the sense that the set
of allowed co-events for different initial states are completely disjoint), but it is
not proven with this thought experiment. For example, it would be interesting
to explore other possibilities such as extending alternative proposals to the PBR
argument (one very recent one is [18]) for the co-events formulation.
In our case, for histories formulations and the co-events in particular, we
actually expect it to be true. By extending the histories for sufficient time and
sufficiently fine-grained, we conjecture (and give further evidence for it) that
the set of possible co-events for any separate state-vectors would be distinct.
This would suggest, that if we observe with sufficient detail the system for long
enough, we will be able to deduce uniquely which was the initial state, provided
that it was a pure state. Evidence that this conjecture holds, is given in the
appendix, where we show that indeed for essentially any two distinct initial
state-vectors |Φ1〉 and |Φ2〉 of a qubit (2-dim Hilbert space), we can explicitly
construct sufficiently fine grained histories, such that the set of co-events C1 and
C2 have no common elements (C1 ∩ C2 = ∅). Distinguishing between two states
is something that always concerns the 2-dim subspace of the Hilbert space that
is spanned by those states (as was stressed in [1] and explained in detail in the
appendix). Therefore the evidence given in the appendix, that the conjecture
holds, is very strong, failing to form a full proof due to some special cases and
some extra attention needed for the infinite dimensional case.
6 Summary and conclusion
We first reviewed the PBR argument for why a statistical interpretation of the
quantum state is not possible. We introduced the histories formulations and
in particular the decoherent histories approach and the co-event formulation.
The reason to examine the PBR argument for histories is twofold. First, in
order to make contact with standard one-moment-of-time quantum theory and
compare the role of the state. Second reason, is related with retrodiction. While
it is not clear that one can determine uniquely to arbitrary precision which one
of the potential realities is eventually realised, it is clear that if two different
initial state-vectors can give rise even to one common reality, there is no hope
of one being able to distinguish between the two situations with certainty. Even
speaking about which was the initial state-vector, in this case, is meaningless.
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Note that histories formulations, are frequently applied to the field of quantum
cosmology where the initial state and the ability to retrodict are very important.
We then showed that the PBR argument applies to histories formulations
looking in section 4, at two versions of the specific example considered in section
2. One is always able to distinguish between the four (at the example) state-
vectors |Ψ1,Ψ1〉, |Ψ1,Ψ2〉 , |Ψ2,Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2,Ψ2〉. However one cannot make the
further step and conclude that we can distinguish between single system state-
vectors |Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2〉, as we saw in section 5. The reason is that some of the
assumptions of PBR, do not hold in histories formulations. In particular, there
is a strange correlation, not related with entanglement, between sub-systems
that the decoherence functional of composite systems has. This property needs
to be further examined and understood [17]. The author however conjectures,
that it would still be possible to distinguish between different initial states,
if one extends the histories suitably, for the co-event formulation. Evidence
for the validity of the conjecture is given in the appendix, where it is proven
explicitly that this is the case for 2-dim Hilbert space except some very special
case, and that it can be generalised to higher (finite) dimensions. To sum up,
the conclusion of the PBR argument is expected to be valid for histories as well,
but it cannot be proven with their gedanken experiment.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we will attempt to prove the conjecture made in the text, that
the allowed co-events for two different state-vectors, are disjoint. We will use the
example of a qubit. However, the importance of this example, is much greater.
When comparing two state-vectors19, we can do so, by restricting attention to
the 2-dimensional subspace that is spanned by the two state-vectors. While it
is true, that many results hold in 2-dimensions and not for higher dimensions,
the comparison of two pure states, is not one of them. The reason this is the
case is because if one has two state-vectors of higher dimensions |Φ1〉, |Φ2〉
∈ H, he can find the two-dimensional subspace that is spanned by those two
vectors HΦ1,Φ2 = span({|Φ1〉, |Φ2〉}). One can then choose |Φ1〉 = |0〉 and
define |1〉 ∈ HΦ1,Φ2 such that it is orthogonal to |0〉, i.e. 〈0|1〉 = 0. Then,
we can express |Φ2〉 = cos θ|0〉 + sin θ|1〉 for some angle θ, and without loss of
generality, we can proceed as if our initial states |Φ1〉, |Φ2〉 were 2-dimensional.
Our attempt to prove the conjecture, consist of the explicit construction
of the sets of co-events corresponding to two different initial states, that are
19For simplicity, of a finite dimensional Hilbert space. For infinite dimensions more care is
needed.
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non-orthogonal. By choosing finer or coarser grained histories (i.e. by having
more moments-of-time) we can construct finer or coarser sets of co-events. The
direction of proof we will follow, is to exploit some property that certain coarse-
graining of histories have, namely the existence of zero covers [5]. This simplifies
considerably the analysis and allows us to find a suitable coarse-graining that
distinguishes the states with only 3-moments-of-time, and therefore 23 different
histories for almost all cases. Unfortunately, as we will see below, for the very
special case that the angle between the two states we want to distinguish is
tan θ = ±1/3, this strategy is not successful. To fully prove the conjecture, one
needs to consider different coarse-grainings with more moments-of-time (and
therefore exponentially more possible histories). With the current development
of the co-event formulation, its extremely difficult to compute the possible co-
events, as the moments of time increase. Moreover, the technical trick used
to prove the conjecture for all the other cases (the use of that particular zero
cover), cannot be used here. However, it seems very implausible, that one can
distinguish between any two state-vectors in this formalism, unless their angle
is tan−1(±1/3). If that was the case, it would certainly be a strange property
that would require further study. It is most likely that some other finer-grained
description would complete the proof, but until the relevant technical methods
to efficiently compute co-events for many moments-of-time appears, our claim
will remain a conjecture. We now return to prove the general case.
The histories we will consider, is essentially 3-moments-of-time. We start
with some initial state |Φ〉 and then measure it three times in the basis we will
give below. We assume trivial evolution (the identity), but we could easily have
any Hamiltonian, and then have to choose the basis measured suitably. Given
a particular Hamiltonian (non-trivial this time), one can also reproduce the
result we will give, considering measurement done only in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis,
by suitably choosing the time t1, t2, t3 that the measurements take place as we
will see in the end of the appendix.
The initial state will be either |Φ1〉 = |0〉 or any other state |Φ2〉 = cos θ|0〉+
sin θ|1〉. We consider the following two orthogonal bases20:
|Ψ0〉 = cos θ|0〉+ sin θ|1〉
|Ψ1〉 = − sin θ|0〉+ cos θ|1〉 (36)
and
|Ψ+〉 = cos(θ + π/4)|0〉+ sin(θ + π/4)|1〉
|Ψ−〉 = cos(θ − π/4)|0〉+ sin(θ − π/4)|1〉 (37)
The histories considered will be: They start with the initial state |Φi〉, and then
are measured in the {|Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉} basis then in the {|Ψ0〉, |Ψ1〉} basis and then
again in the {|Ψ+〉, |Ψ−〉}. We will label the histories depending on the outcome
of each measurement in the following way (measurements are from right to left):
20Note that |Φ2〉 = |Ψ0〉
22
h1 = (Ψ+Ψ0Ψ+), h2 = (Ψ+Ψ1Ψ+), h3 = (Ψ+Ψ0Ψ−), h4 = (Ψ+Ψ1Ψ−)
h5 = (Ψ−Ψ0Ψ+), h6 = (Ψ−Ψ1Ψ+), h7 = (Ψ−Ψ0Ψ−), h8 = (Ψ−Ψ1Ψ−) (38)
Histories h1, h2, h3 and h4 end at final time in the |Ψ+〉 while h5, h6, h7 and
h8 end in |Ψ−〉. We compute the amplitudes of histories for |Φ1〉 = |0〉 (the
subscript at the amplitudes α1 signifies that it correspond to initial state |Φ1〉):
α1(h1) = 1/2 cos(θ + π/4) , α1(h2) = 1/2 cos(θ + π/4)
α1(h3) = 1/2 cos(θ − π/4) , α1(h4) = −1/2 cos(θ − π/4)
α1(h5) = 1/2 cos(θ + π/4) , α1(h6) = −1/2 cos(θ + π/4)
α1(h7) = 1/2 cos(θ − π/4) , α1(h8) = 1/2 cos(θ − π/4) (39)
The only zero quantum measure sets are the {h3, h4} and {h5, h6} for a general
angle θ.
Here we should note that there are other zero quantum measure sets only
in the cases where θ = 0, that reduces to |0〉 which we will see below, and for
tan θ = ±1/3 which is the exceptional case mentioned earlier that prevents us
from providing a full proof of the conjecture. For these very special cases, the
fine grained description we used here is not sufficient to prove the conjecture,
and further fine graining (measurements) are required.
Returning to the general θ case, we have 4 classical co-events and the set of
allowed co-events are:
C1 = {{h1}, {h2}, {h7}, {h8}} (40)
For |Φ2〉 = cos θ|0〉+sin θ|1〉 the amplitudes are (note that they are independent
of θ):
α2(h1) =
1
2
√
2
, α2(h2) =
1
2
√
2
α2(h3) =
1
2
√
2
, α2(h4) = − 1
2
√
2
α2(h5) =
1
2
√
2
, α2(h6) = − 1
2
√
2
α2(h7) =
1
2
√
2
, α2(h8) =
1
2
√
2
(41)
The subscript α2 signifies that that the initial state is |Φ2〉. The sets with
quantum measure zero are:
{h1, h4}, {h2, h4}, {h3, h4}, {h5, h6}, {h6, h7}, {h6, h8} (42)
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We see that all fine grained histories are contained in one quantum measure
zero set and thus there are no classical co-events. Only pairs of histories are
allowed, and we have 6 potential co-events:
C2 = {{h1, h2}, {h1, h3}, {h2, h3}, {h5, h7}, {h5, h8}, {h7, h8}} (43)
It is easy to see that C1 ∩ C2 = ∅. This is general for an arbitrary θ (other than
a very special case mentioned above), and thus any two state-vectors of a qubit
give rise to completely disjoint set of potential co-events and thus correspond
to different ontology, in the sense discussed in the main text.
We now return at the earlier remark, that all of the above can be re-expressed
in terms of measurements in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis given a Hamiltonian, if we
suitably choose the times that the measurements take place. If for example we
this Hamiltonian
H =
(
1 i
−i 1
)
(44)
It gives rise to the following unitary evolution
U(t) = exp(−it)
(
cos t sin t
− sin t cos t
)
(45)
We choose to measure at t1 = (θ − π/4) and at t2 = θ and finally at t3 = (θ +
7π/4), always in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis. It is easy to calculate that the amplitudes
we get for these histories for any of the two initial states, are exactly the same
as the ones we calculated earlier in the appendix in Eqs. (39 , 41), with the
following adjustments. (a) In the labeling we replace Ψ+ and Ψ1 with 1 while we
replace Ψ− and Ψ0 with 0 (i.e. the history h3 for example, that was (Ψ+Ψ0Ψ−)
is now (100)) and (b) there is an overall factor of exp(−i(θ − π/4)) in the
amplitudes of all histories, which however, does not affect the quantum measure.
Since the quantum measure is the same, it follows that set of allowed co-events
is also the same.
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